The War of the Liars

After the USSR fell its strategists decided its best offense against the West consisted of disinformation.

The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia is a geopolitical book by Aleksandr Dugin. The book has had a large influence within the Russian military, police, and foreign policy elites and it has been used as a textbook in the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian military. Its publication in 1997 was well-received in Russia and powerful Russian political figures subsequently took an interest in Dugin, a Russian fascist and nationalist who has developed a close relationship with Russia’s Academy of the General Staff. …


The book declares that “the battle for the world rule of Russians” has not ended and Russia remains “the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois, anti-American revolution“. The Eurasian Empire will be constructed “on the fundamental principle of the common enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism, strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us.”
Military operations play relatively little role. The textbook believes in a sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services. The operations should be assisted by a tough, hard-headed utilization of Russia’s gas, oil, and natural resources to bully and pressure other countries.[
The book states that “the maximum task [of the future] is the ‘Finlandization‘ of all of Europe”.

Wikipedia

That disinformation effort is now manifest not just in the US but in Europe, perhaps especially in the EU.

In just a month, regular elections to the European Parliament will be held, the outcome of which might lead to an increase in the role of the Kremlin in Europe, revision of anti-Russian sanctions, and weakening of the pro-Ukrainian lobby. …


The report of Mikk Marran, Estonian Director of Foreign Intelligence, says that the Kremlin clearly intends to split the European Parliament, make Europeans doubt the importance of this institution, discredit sanctions as a method of “retaliation against Russia.” The Russians cannot work out in the open like it was a few years ago, the EU special services warn. They would change tactics and strategy to camouflage their actions. And a number of gaps in European security, to which experts draw attention, will play into their hands.
Thus, Estonian politician Tunne Kelam assures that Europe has not realized the reality of the Russian threat. The Kremlin managed to put down the vigilance of the Europeans, constantly changing their tactics. “The strength of Russia’s approach is that it doesn’t use the same tools everywhere. Instead, its tools differ depending on the country it is targeting. What the Kremlin does in, say Greece, is different to what it does in Ireland, but all of these activities are still part of the same tool kit,” Foxall, from the Henry Jackson Society, said in a commentary for CNBC.

112 International

There are indications that a new generation of American counter-tactics have emerged, perhaps starting in the closing years of the Obama administration but certainly during Trump’s tenure. It is marked by the use of sanctions, proxy warfare and undermining or attracting Putin’s most vulnerable clients in North Korea, Syria, Venezuela and Cuba.

Unlike the Russians there is no popularly read Master Plan for American grand strategy unless one counts Brzezinski’s Grand Chessboard which advocates a balance of power act on the Eurasian continent.

The obvious weakness of Dugin’s strategy is its complete reliance on external offensive operations. There is no internal reform program aimed at improving Russia’s efficiency and economic dynamism. Like the Czars the modern rulers of the Kremlin think Russia can be a great power while remaining economically backward.

By contrast the greatest innovation of Trump is his emphasis on renewing American competitiveness. In contrast to Dugin, Trump’s strategy is largely internal — and it has to be. While Russia appears to rely on disinformation, Trump is relying on America cornering all the emerging technologies of the 21st century.

Trump vs Dugin. It’s an interesting geostrategic matchup. But it would be a mistake to think the fight is solely between Russia and the USA. The big rival is China and it’s interesting how this giant adversary has some kind of stealth coating which reflects less than Russian collusion.

While Russia can only aspire to penetrate the network China aims to actually be the network, to dominate the physical layer and technologies like artificial intelligence, which makes it potentially far more dangerous than the Kremlin.

Despite a senior U.S. cybersecurity official warning that “Britain will harm economic and military co-operation between the countries if it uses Huawei for its next-generation 5G mobile network,” and the last-minute leaking of CIA warnings that had been given to the U.K. government alleging that Huawei had been funded by branches of China’s military and intelligence, U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May has decided that Huawei will not be excluded from the U.K.’s 5G network build-out, albeit with restrictions.

Forbes

Unlike Russia, China has an internal strategy unmatched perhaps even by the United States. Beijing has a plan to become the dominant economy and technology powerhouse on the planet. Listening to Bernie Sanders and even Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama one wonders whether anyone in the political leadership of American liberalism is willing or even able to take on the Chinese or Russians on the strategic level.

They seem almost senile, concerned with appearances, attached to fads, puttering around in the most curious manner. What occupies them is victimhood, sexual politics, climate engineering and virtue signalling, which would be alright in an institution but suicidal on the stage of hard-edged power politics.

They say they are the “only adults in the room” yet the more you look the less you find.

It’s perfectly rational to say “Trump’s strategy is wrong” for it well may be. But it is incumbent on the political system to craft a better one of their own, one which goes beyond soundbites and talking points.

The objection to this critique is that Sanders’ et al are ‘secretly sophisticated’; that they are in possession of special classified knowledge that the public lack and therefore policies like Open Borders make analytic sense in the nuanced universe. But this is unlikely.

The lesson of the last few decades is that the Western political elites are not much smarter and often a good deal less intelligent than the first 10,000 names in the telephone directory.