The key thing to keep in mind in any conflict in the Indo-Pacific is that sea denial/access depends as much on ground expeditionary forces covering naval movements as it does on forces afloat. This applies to China as much to the USA. “The RAND corporation has run simulations which suggest that it would take a salvo of around 50 missiles to knock out a dozen amphibious warfare ships attempting to cross the relatively narrow Taiwan Strait. It is estimated that it would take a modest 10,000 to 20,000 pounds of ordinance to decimate an amphibious landing force of around 90 ships in a hostile littoral.”
This means China cannot readily advance without suppressing ground based precision fire threats to its amphibious fleet.
The USMC has acknowledged the need for a ‘paradigm shift and the reinvigoration of a unified naval approach that effectively integrates sea control and maritime power projection capabilities’. The USMC’s answer – still being refined – is Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). Rather than being supported by the US Navy at sea, the Marines instead provide crucial support to the US Navy in securing sea control, and, thereby, access to denied waters.
RUSI
Taiwan is a tough target, with most of the feasible landing beaches located on the northwest and southwest ends of the island, near the cities of Taipei and Kaohsiung, as shown in light blue below. The eastern beaches would be open to interdiction from the Pacific and immediately inland is the mountainous interior, hindering rapid exploitation.
This makes the western side, especially the southwestern beaches the likely target. The southern beaches were to have been the target of the historical planned 1944 US invasion of Taiwan.
in 1944, planners concluded that the geography made it necessary to establish a lodgment on the southern tip of the island and use it as a base of operations to build up enough combat power to clear the coastal plan on the west of the island — where the majority of the population lives — from south to north. …
The requirement to use a port to build up combat power on the island created a critical vulnerability. According to the 1944 plan, “it is estimated that enemy action to block and damage the harbors and bridges and our offensive operations will greatly curtail the harbor and road capacities in the early stages.” While China has shorter lines of communication to project power to Taiwan than the Causeway plan envisioned, it likely still needs a port and would struggle to expand the lodgment against a determined defender.
War on the Rocks
Could China do this under fire? Precision US rocket artillery of the HIMARS-ATACMS, NMESIS and GLSDB all have a range of at least 150 km, are transportable by C-130, LCAC or landing barge to many points along the First Island Chain. A string of batteries along Taiwan’s mountainous spine, down through the Philippine Babuyan Islands and anchored on Northern Luzon would close the southern flank to amphibious attack and make the Chinese transit of the Luzon Strait very difficult. A map showing 150 km missile ranges is shown below.
This would make it very hard to cross the strait and land with sufficient force to take the island. Transporting follow up troops and supplies would also be problematic.
With the development of the USMC’s medium range ground based air defense system, air transit through Taiwan’s southern flank may be similarly denied. Based on Israel’s Iron Dome, the USMC system has been tested at White Sands.
Following three successful kill shots at a New Mexico testing site last month, the country’s second-most senior Marine Corps officer says he’s ready to invest in the service’s Medium-Range Intercept Capability, a technology that will “complete the tool kits” of Marine Littoral Regiment commanders…
The Medium-Range Intercept Capability (MRIC) prototype, which successfully shot down three drones playing the role of cruise missiles during a demonstration at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico in late June, has several subsystems. They include the Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar and the Common Aviation Command and Control System. It also incorporates the ground launcher and Tamir interceptor missiles used by Israel’s Iron Dome.
“We needed a longer-range air defense capability to be able to cover these highly mobile units,” said Smith, referring to the Marine Littoral Regiments. “We asked for a wicked solution to a wicked problem. High mobility, lightweight and much longer range. And MRIC provided that to us.”
Breaking Defense
This would complicate the use of PLA airborne troops and aerial resupply. Given the importance of ground based sea and air denial to the success of any landing operation against Taiwan, it must be assumed that China will plan to neutralize positions in the islands surrounding their target or risk total failure. This can be achieved through:
- Chinese diplomatic victory, such as a refusal by the Philippines to host US/Allied forces;
- A prolonged naval operation to defeat the USN/Japan and blockade Taiwan and
- A ground operation to reduce Northern Luzon, the Babuyan Islands in the strait and ultimately Taiwan itself.
Which of these strategies China will attempt, individually or in combination, only Beijing can say. But in the event the Chinese Communist Party chooses force, geography suggests Luzon and the Ryukyus may be entailed.